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LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING
ALASTAIR R. LUCAS*
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory and management decisions by public resource and
environmental agencies require a basis in law. This legal authority
may be found in constitutional documents, in legislation, in judgemade law, or in convention based on unwritten constitutional
doctrine.1 Since the scope of consultation by such agencies is an
element of the decisionmaking process, rights of members of the
public to participate in agency decisions, if these rights are to be
enforced, must also have an explicit legal foundation.
This paper will examine the legal case for public participation. The
first part will attempt to determine whether, and to what extent,
there exist in law substantive rights to participate in typical natural
resource and environmental decision processes administered by
government departments or agencies. Apart from enforceable legal
rights to participate, significant opportunities to participate may
exist through government or agency policies based on discretionary
statutory powers of various types. Since these opportunities are
dependent on the grace or wisdom of particular decisionmakers, the
distinction between rights and opportunities to participate is critically important.
The second part will consider whether legal actions, including
actions to require public participation, provide in themselves an
effective forum for public involvement in environmental decisions. It
is possible that a type of participation is available through traditional
legal processes in situations where rights or opportunities to participate directly in agency processes are not available.
*Faculty of Law University of British Columbia; Chairman Legal Committee, Canadian
Arctic Resources Committee.
This paper is based in part on research conducted for the Canadian Arctic Resources
Committee with support from the Donner Foundation. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance of Trevor Bell and Dougald Brown, who read earlier drafts and provided
helpful comments and criticism.
1. This is particularly true in Canada and Great Britain, which have partly unwritten
constitutions and no constitutional Bills of Rights. For a summary of the essential differences in Canadian and American constitutional theory and content see Carter, The National
Energy Board of Canadaand the American Administrative ProcedureAct-A Comparative
Study, 34 Sask. L. Rev. 104, 106-109 (1969).
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In both parts emphasis will be on Canadian law. However, reference will also be made to aspects of the participatory process in
England and the United States for purposes of comparison. It will be
argued that there are few clearly established rights to participate in
environmental decisions available to Canadian citizens. To the extent
that citizens are permitted opportunities for participation, these are
narrow, formal and largely ineffective.
RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE
Why Involve the Public?
The growing awareness of members of the general public concerning matters likely to affect them, and the consequent desire for
additional information and involvement in the resolution of these
matters is a phenomenon of the last decade in Canada. Although this
heightened public awareness is apparent in a number of areas, many
of the best examples involve environmental issues. Numerous controversies in which strong pressure for public involvement was put on
government or agency officials have been documented in Canada,
England and the United States. 2
There is little consensus among social scientists on the reasons for
these developments. Nor is there agreement on the role that public
participation can or should play in agency decisionmaking. However,
for purposes of this paper the following general statement of reasons
for public participation developed by a federal task force on environmental impact assessment has been adopted as a useful background
for discussion of legal issues. The task force stated four reasons:
1. Affected persons likely to be unrepresented in environmental
assessment and decision processes are provided an opportunity to
present their views;
2. Members of the public may provide useful additional information
to the decisionmaker, especially when values are involved that

cannot be easily quantified;
3. Accountability of political and administrative decisionmakers is
likely to be reenforced if the process is open to public view.
Openness puts pressure on administrators to follow the required
procedure in all cases;
4. Public confidence in the reviewers and decisionmakers is
enhanced, since citizens can clearly see in every case that all
issues have been fully and carefully considered. 3
2. Among the best known examples are the Third London Airport controversy in
England, the S.S.T. debate and the Grand Canyon dam proposals in the U.S.; and the Skagit
Valley flooding, Churchill River diversion, and Spadina Expressway issues in Canada.
3. Report of the Task Force on Environmental Impact Assessment: Policy and Process 8
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Reportl.
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The latter two reasons are of particular importance. They suggest
that one of the chief values of public participation is that it provides
a means for scrutinizing environmental decisions. Like other scrutiny
techniques, such as administrative review by other governmental
agencies4 and judicial review in the courts, public involvement and
consequent publicity provide a source of pressure to help ensure that
both administrators and elected officials act fairly and follow the
required procedure in all cases.'
Forms of Participation
Participation can take many forms. It is necessary, therefore, to
define more particularly what is meant by "participation" and to
specify the decisionmaking context in which it will be examined.
The concept of citizen participation is often said to be an integral
part of the political system of liberal democratic nations such as
Canada, the United States and Great Britain. The ballot box is cited
as the most common and basic form of public participation. Through
this process, governments are elected whose mandates are theoretically based on the consent of the voting public.6 Thus, elected governmental officials are said to be responsible to Parliament, and
ultimately to their constituents for resource and environmental
management decisions made under their auspices. In Canada and
Great Britain where a majority party executive often tightly controls
the legislature, this concept of ministerial responsibility is regarded as
a hallowed constitutional safeguard.
However, even the most casual observation discloses that elections
are rarely fought on issues involving specific alternatives. Particular
issues are either submerged in broad, carefully tailored election issues
or are simply forgotten because they arose early in a government's
term of office. 7
But, beyond participation through the ballot box, it is difficult to
encapsulate the concept of public participation. One governmental
working group has observed that:
4. Such as appeals from Director's decisions to the Pollution Control Board, thence to a

committee of the Cabinet under § 12 of the British Columbia Pollution Control Act, B.C.
Stat. 1967, c. 34, as amended; and the Environmental Appeal Board process under Part X of
the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, Ont. Stat. 1971, c. 86, as amended.
5. See Task Force Report, supra note 3; Lucas, Environmental Impact Assessment, A
Legal Perspective,Proceedings: National Conference on Enviornmental Impact: Assessment:
Philosophy and Methodology 30, 44, Agassiz Centre for Water Studies (Nov. 15-16, 1973).
6. See Head, The Ideology and Practiceof Citizen Participationin Citizen Participation
Canada 14-15 (J. Draper ed. 1972).
7. See Graham, Reflections on a Planning Failure: Ontario Hydro's Proposed Nanicoke
to Pickering Transmission Corridor 12-14 (Paper presented to the Water Quality Management Decision-Making Seminar, University of Victoria, March 1973).
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Making observations about the phenomenon of citizen participation
is no easy task. First, it appears to be so varied and to affect so many
sectors of our society that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an
individual or group of individuals to have experienced its many variations. Second, while we know something about people acting in
groups, little empirical research has been done on individual behavior
in this area. Then, there is a media bias to contend with-a bias that
tends to overemphasize the dramatic and to play down the more
mundane side of the phenomenon. Finally, as many social scientists
are beginning to admit, there may be no such thing as objective
empirical research of a social or even a physical phenomenon; that is,
the observer's values and biases may be crucial in determining what
is selected and how it is observed and interpreted; and, for this
reason, all observations do not so much constitute reality as they do
the observer's perceptions or interpretations. 8
Consequently, most attempts in Canada to characterize public
participation have either listed examples or simply assumed the
effectiveness and legitimacy of a particular form of participation. 9
The sparse legal literature that touches the subject of public participation almost uniformly adopts the latter approach. The formal
public hearing technique that lawyers find so comfortably familiar is
assumed to be the only appropriate form of public participation. 0
A Typical EnvironmentalDecision Process
Apart from the legal literature, articulation of types and processes
of public participation has been attempted. 1 I In this paper no
detailed typology will be developed or adapted. Rather, the existence
of legal rights or opportunities to participate in whatever form will
be considered at successive stages of a typical resource or environmental decision process. The form of participation available is obviously important in assessing effectiveness. However, the question of
techniques for participation will not even arise unless a right or
opportunity to participate is first identified or established. It is this
threshold issue of right or opportunity that is the principal subject of
the following review.
8. Citizen Involvement 8 (Working Paper prepared for Ontario Government Committee
on Government Productivity, April 1972).
9. See, e.g., Head, supra note 6, at 15-25.
10. See Jowell, The Limits of the Public Hearing as a Tool in Urban Planning, 21 Ad. L.
Rev. 123, 140-43 (1969). An exception in the Canadian literature is Franson & Burns,
EnvironmentalRights for the CanadianCitizen: A Prescriptionfor Reform, 12 Alta. L. Rev.
153 (1974).
11. See Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation,J. Amer. Inst. Plan. 216 (1969);
Compton, Community Development Theory and Practice in Citizen Participation: Canada,
supra note 6, at 382; Citizen Involvement, supra note 8, at 32-43.
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The process to be considered is a mixed regulatory and management process based on some type of permit or approval system
backed by administrative1 2 and quasi-criminal sanctions. Examples
of this type of process include those of regional planning bodies,
natural resource allocation departments, and pollution control
agencies.
Focus will be directed to four stages of this typical environmental
decision process. The first is the process by which issues are formulated. The question of who has the right to initiate agency processes
is of critical importance. A second stage is the process of marshaling
and testing information on any issue before the agency. This may be
done wholly or partly through the agency's own staff and may
include input from other governmental sources. It may also include
participation by private citizens or citizen groups. The third stage is
deliberation and formulation of decisions by the agency. The final
step is implementation of the decision. This may include development of techniques and strategies for implementation where the
decision leaves scope for alternatives. Also included are monitoring
implementation actions of the regulated parties and initiating appropriate enforcement measures.
A. Issue Formulation
Under Canadian approval-type environmental management legislation the initiating role is reserved exclusively to the regulated industries and the tribunal or agency itself.
The British Columbia Pollution Control Act," Alberta Clean
Air" and Clean Water Acts,' I Ontario Environmental Protection
Act,' 6 and federal National Energy Board Act' I and Fisheries Act' 8
can be regarded as typical. Issues are raised for determination by the
agency only after an application is filed for authority to undertake
some environmentally damaging activity or for approval of some
proposed waste disposal system.
Usually the agency itself also has authority to raise issues for
decision on its own initiative. It may, for example, be empowered to
order any person or corporation to apply for a permit or approval or
for an amendment to an existing permit or approval within a stated
12. Eg., suspension or cancellation of licenses or permits by administrators or agencies.
13. B.C. Stat. 1967, c. 34 as amended [hereinafter cited as Pollution Control Act].
14. Alta. Stat. 1971, c. 16.
15. Alta. Stat. 1971, c. 17.
16. Ont. Stat. 1971, c. 86, as amended by Ont. Stat. 1972, c. 1, § 64;Ont. Stat. 1972, c.
106 [hereinafter cited as E.P.A.1.
17. Can. Rev. Stat c. N-6 (1970) as amended.
18. Can. Rev. Stat. c. F-14 (1970) as amended [hereinafter cited as Fisheries Act].
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time period.' 9 In most cases the agency is also authorized to undertake more general inquiries to develop and articulate performance
and effluent standards for natural resource
based activities 2 o or for
21
environments.
receiving
the quality of
Members of the public have no rights under these statutes to
initiate permit issue (or amendment), or standard setting decision
processes. Procedures do not exist for forcing investigations by an
agency nor even for petitioning the agency to carry out a particular

investigation.
Thus, apart from the possibility of favorable exercise of discretion
by agencies, no public participation rights exist at the issue formulation stage of typical Canadian environmental decisionmaking processes. Permit or approval applications are carefully prepared by the
regulated industries to limit specific issues raised by the application
and to define the relevant issues in the most favorable form.2 2 The
issues are narrowed and cast so far as possible in objective and technical terms, rather than value terms. Often this process is not only
assisted but required by the legislation and rules governing the
agency. 23 To reduce the issue to technical terms is in the interest of
the agency. In this way decisions are seen to rest on "hard data" that
will better withstand casual public scrutiny. 24 Both agency and
19. See, e.g., Pollution Control Act, § 5(la); E.P.A. § 43; Fisheries Act § 33.1 (Supp. 1,
c. 17).
20. E.g., Pollution Control Act, § 14; National Energy Board Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. N-6,
§ 11 (1970); Northern Inland Waters Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 128, § 15 (Supp. 1 1970).
21. Hearings for this purpose have been held over the past three years by the British
Columbia Pollution Control Branch under section 14 of the Pollution Control Act.
22. For documentation of this process under the British Columbia Pollution Control Act,
see Lucas & Moore, The Utah Controversy: A Case Study of Public Participationin Pollution Control, 13 Nat. Res. J. 36, 46-47, 73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Utah ControversyI. See also Vincent, Cornelius Vanderbilt is Alive and Well: D.LA.N.D. and the Public
Interest 6 (unpublished paper presented to Canadian Political Science Assn. Annual Meeting,
March 1974).
23. Application forms such as those prescribed by the British Columbia Pollution Control Branch tend to have this effect. So do deficiency letter processes like that of the
National Energy Board in which agency staff make detailed requests for supplementary
technical information. This process has no specific basis in the National Energy Board Act,.
regulations or rules of practice and procedure beyond the basic requirements for information to be submitted by applicants in N.E.B. Pt. VI Regulations § § 4(1) and 5(1); and
N.E.B. Rules of Practice and Procedure § 5(3). See Gibbs, MacFarlane & Knowles, A
Review of the National Energy Board Policiesand Practicesand Recent Hearings,9 Alta. L.
Rev. 523, 545 (1971).
24. This is apparent in the Utah Controversy pollution control case study. See supra note
2, at 72-73. A similar process can be seen in the National Energy Board's handling of policy
issues raised by public interest groups, such as submissions by Pollution Probe and the
Consumers Association on the subject of social cost at the hearing on a major electric power
export application by Ontario Hydro in May of 1973: Interview with George Hunter
(counsel for the groups), July 1974. The federal court subsequently agreed with the N.E.B.
on this point in refusing leave to appeal. See Consumers Association and Pollution Probe v.
Ontario Hydro and National Energy Board, No. 74-A-5 (F.C.A., April 16, 1974).
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elected public officials are likely to be protected from public criticism.
This problem is exemplified by pollution control permit systems
in which applications are made for approval of particular waste
disposal systems supported by detailed plans and engineering specifications.2
Applicants and agencies have consistently interpreted
agency jurisdiction to be based on the detailed application submitted, even though applications are often prepared following extensive consultation with agency staff.2 6 The result is that even where
some type of public participation is permitted later at the information stage, submissions and questions on alternative sites, plant
processes, or methods of disposal, and sometimes even on alternative
equipment or operating techniques have been excluded as irrelevant. 2 7
There is an even more fundamental problem. Single resource
statutes administered by separate departments or agencies allow
applicants to obtain a succession of minor approvals through low
visibility processes. Often financial commitments are made on the
strength of these approvals. The cumulative effect is that a major
development may be a virtual fait accompli, with only minor technical details unresolved, even before applications are made. 28
This preemption problem has been attacked in a number of
Canadian jurisdictions by legislation conferring authority on some
public body or official to inquire into general issues of resource
development and use, including site location for certain types of
25. As under the British Columbia Pollution Control Act, supra note 21, and The Utah
Controversy, supra note 22.
26. See The Utah Controversy, supra note 22, at 72. The National Energy Board recently
interpreted § 44(a) of the National Energy Board Act as restricting its jurisdiction on gas
facilities applications under Part IIl of the Act to consideration of the availability of the
particular gas under contract. The Board therefore refused to permit cross examination by
intervenors on the general subject of future gas supply available to Ontario Utilities. The
Board's ruling was upheld by the Federal Court in Union Gas v. Trans Canada Pipelines
Limited and National Energy Board, No. T-2983-74 (F.C.T.D. August 21, 1974), Mahoney,
J.
Similarly, in hearings on an application by Interprovincial Pipelines Limited for a certificate of public convenience and necessity in respect of a proposed Sarnia-Montreal extension
of the I.P.L. system, counsel for the Committee for an Independent Canada was restricted in
attempts to cross examine an I.P.L. witness on cost figures calculated in consideration of
alternative routes. See Transcript, hearing order No. OH-1-74, Vol. 1 at 82 (May 14, 1974).
27. See, e.g., The Utah Controversy, supra note 22, at 60; D. Estrin & J. Swaigen,
Environment on Trial, 158-59 (1973) regarding waste management hearings under the
Ontario E.P.A.
28. See The Utah Controversy, supra note 22, at 56-67. See also Joint Federal-Provincial
Task Force, A Preliminary Study of the Environmental Impacts of the Proposed James Bay
Development Project, (esp. Introduction) (December 1971); The Elora Gorge Controversy,
documented in Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 288-89.
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activities, development of frontier regions, and commencement of
minor activities with potentially significant cumulative effects. 2 9
HoWever, while these statutes usually provide for some type of
public participation, powers to inquire as well as powers to permit
public participation are framed in permissive rather than mandatory
terms. Statutes are drafted with discretionary words in the key
authorizing sections, and courts, particularly in Canada and England,
have shown little propensity to issue injunctions or prerogative writs
to require agency action in the absence of clear mandatory language." There are no rights to participate, only opportunities that
the relevant agency in its discretion may or may not decide to
provide.3 I
Thus, at the issue formulation stage citizens are without clearly
defined rights to participate. They must approach the agency to
request that an opportunity for public participation be allowed. This
decision is in the discretion of the agency. If an application has not
yet been filed, there is no proceeding before the agency in which to
allow participation, even though agency staff are probably negoti29. See, e.g., The Environment and Land Use Act, B.C. Stat. 1971, c. 17; The Planning
and Development Act, Ont. Stat. 1973, c. 51; The Environment Conservation Act, Alta.
Rev. Stat. c. 125 (1970) as amended; The Land Commission Act, B.C. Stat. 1973, c. 46.
30. As in Re Piatocka and Utah Construction and Mining Co., [19721 21 D.L.R.3d 87
(B.C. Sup. Ct. 1971), which was an action to force wider participation in a public hearing on
a pollution control permit application. Matkin, Environmental Policy Formulation: Public
Participationand the Role of the Courts, in Environmental Abuse and the Canadian Citizen,
a study prepared for the Federal Justice Department (Feb. 1973), states at 56 that,
it appears most unlikely that judicial review will provide any relief to individuals and groups seeking a voice in the setting of standards and rule making by
the administration. The courts are very reluctant to review an exercise of
executive discretion and most pollution control laws rely on executive discretion for the detail of standards. Therefore, reform of the administrative rule
making process will have to come through legislative change.
See generally R. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice 386-88 (1971). Reid also points
out at 45 that a discretion to dispense with a hearing may be overriden by a "common law"
rule requiring a hearing. This merely refers to the principles of natural justice which may
permit participation by directly affected individuals, as opposed to public interests. See text
accompanying note 53, supra.
31. An important recent example of public participation in issue formulation is the
preliminary hearings held by Commissioner Mr. Justice T. R. Berger in the MacKenzie
Valley Pipeline Inquiry. Justice Berger conducted hearings at Yellowknife, Inuvik, Whitehorse and Ottawa in the Spring of 1974 to hear representations as to what specific issues are
within the Inquiry Terms of Reference and views on the procedure that should be followed
in the main part of the Inquiry. Subsequently, Berger, J., handed down preliminary rulings
on these subjects: see Preliminary Rulings, July 12, 1974. However, it should be noted that
the Berger Commission is essentially an ad hoc body, appointed by Order in Council (P.C.
1974-641) under § 19(h) of the Territorial Lands Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. T-6 (1970). There
is no statutory requirement that any hearings be held on right-of-way applications to the
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, much less that the public be involved in the
definition of issues and procedure for hearings.
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ating the application with the prospective applicant. 3 2 If the application is filed, participation is still not likely to be permitted because
of concern for maintaining proper agency-industry relations. Matters
considered confidential will be involved, 3 3 and deficiency processes

to clarify or perfect the application are regarded as technical matters
for the agency alone.3 4
. Even if an opportunity to participate is permitted, it is likely to be
at the information stage after the application is filed. At this point

the issues have already been framed, and citizens are in the position
of attempting to interpret and question the fully supported conclusions and recommendations of skilled professionals. It is too late to
propose alternative sites or even seriously to question the technology
proposed. This problem suggests the need for some type of public

participation in planning by public and even private developers prior
to application.
In addition, many application procedures could be extended or

adapted to allow direct citizen initiation of resource and environmental management decisions. For example, there is no reason in
principle why forest or land management legislation could not be
adapted to permit citizens to request that particular land be preserved or set aside for nonintensive uses such as recreation.3
In the case of more general issues, such as development of standards or criteria, the public is similarly precluded from taking initia-

tives. Here issues are shaped by the agency itself, usually in consultation with the affected industry. Participation has been invited in the
32. A good example is the proposed Mackenzie Valley Natural Gas Pipeline. The
National Energy Board staff became involved in environmental studies and technical discussion with Canadian Arctic Gas Study Limited and its predecessors more than two years
before an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity was formally filed
with the Board. See Workgroup on Canadian Energy Policy, A Case for Delaying the
Mackenzie Valley Natural Gas Pipeline 94 (June 1974).
33. One concern is that disclosure of details of operating processes and financing may
prejudice the applicants' competitive business position. This is a major reason why the Pulp
and Paper Effluent Regulations (S.O.R./71-578) under the Fisheries Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c.
F-14 (1970) as amended do not apply to existing mills until they are specified by Order-inCouncil to apply to particular mills listed in a schedule. Time frames and technical means of
achieving compliance with the standards are first negotiated directly with each mill. At this
writing the schedule is still blank. See Morley, Pollutionas a Crime: The FederalResponse,
5 Man. L.J. 297, 300 (1973).
34. There is usually no specific statutory authority beyond general supporting information requirements for deficiency processes by which the applicant is required, through
formal consultative procedures, to supplement or clarify information filed in support of the
application. The National Energy Board's deficiency letter process is a good example. See
Fisher, The Role of the National Energy Board in Controlling the Export of Natural Gas
from Canada, 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 553, 576 (1971); Gibbs, MacFarlane & Knowles, A
Review of the N.E.B. Policiesand Practicesand Recent Hearings,supra note 23.
35. See generally, Franson, Legislation to Establish EcologicalReserves for the Preservation ofNaturalAreas, 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 583 (1972).
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development of standards by some agencies, 3 6 but the type of
standards to be established and the timing and procedure for establishment have been regarded as matters entirely within the discretion
of the agency. 3 "
All of this is not to suggest that informal public pressure, either
through media or through contact with elected representatives and
agency personnel, has no effect. Agencies have bowed to public
pressure and commenced investigation of particular environmental
problems or undertaken regulation in areas previously ignored. 38
However, at present this public pressure must be applied totally outside statutory processes. There are few established procedures available through which agencies can be formally required to take action
or even carefully to investigate and determine whether action is
warranted on particular issues. 3 9
B. Information Gathering Stage
Some Canadian resource and environmental management statutes
provide for public participation on issues arising out of an application already before the agency. This is normally required by the
agency and by the elected representatives to whom it is responsible,
not as necessary to the democratic process but simply as a means of
informing members of the public likely to be affected of the nature
of the proposed activity. Participation is also considered one means
by which the agency collects information on the issue to be decided,
but it is not regarded as an important source of new information by
most administrators.4 0 The public is involved largely for the public
36. E.g., by the British Columbia Pollution Control Branch in the development of
Industry standards.
37. See Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 154; Ask the People, proceedings of a
multidisciplinary workshop on Public Participation in the Environmental Management
Decision-Making Process, Appendix B, at 1-3 (G. Morley ed. 1972).
38. E.g., the hearing held on the Utah pollution permit application. See The Utah Controversy, supra note 22, at 44-45. Other examples include the inclusion of nutrients discharge restrictions as Part III of the Canada Water Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 5 (Supp. 11970)
and The Chlor Alkali Mercury Regulations, 106 Canada Gazette Pt. 1 436 (No. 7, Apr. 12,
1972). See Morley, Legal Developments in Canadian Water Management, 11 W. Ont. L. Rev.
139, 146-47 (1972); Morley, supra note 33, at 301, 305. Another example is the Ontario
"partial D.D.T. ban" of 1970 following extensive public pressure generated by conservationists, notably Pollution Probe at the University of Toronto. See Environment on Trial,
supra note 27, at 171.
39. One exception is the contaminant damage investigation procedure in § 92 of the
Ontario E.P.A. It should be noted however that § 92(2) states that "Upon receipt of a
"
request, the Minister may cause an investigation to be made ..
40. Informing the public has been stated by B.C. Pollution Control Branch Officials to be
the major objective of hearings on applications, and the reason that few hearings have been
held. The amendments to the English Town and Country Planning Act 1972, c. 42, esp. § 3,
that replace public hearings on structure plans with "examinations in public" of experts
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relations benefit to the agency and the elected representatives to
whom it is responsible. Members of the public are informed; to a
lesser degree they are consulted and allowed some opportunity to
respond to the proposal before the agency. Procedures established
are usually consistent with this emphasis on informing rather than
consulting and effectively involving the public.' I
A good example is a recent hearing under the Federal Expropriation Act' 2 on the proposed taking of residential properties by the
Ministry of Transport for expansion of Vancouver International Airport. During the course of the hearing, MOT officials established an
information office at the airport and distributed literature rationalizing the expansion and quoting statistics to calm fears about
increased noise and traffic congestion. At the same time, objectors at
the hearing were attempting to force the Ministry to disclose technical consultants' reports that would have significantly clarified the
nature of the proposed project. 3
More basic constraints on the right of the public to participate at
the information stage exist. First, very few statutes require public
participation of any sort. Franson and Burns have recently reported,
for example, that a review of 14 federal statutes show that hearings
are required in only two cases.4 4 They also indicate that provision
for other forms of participation is equally rare.4 5
Second, even where statutory authority is provided for public
participation, the power is almost uniformly conferred in discretionary terms.4 6 Examples are abundant. The British Columbia Pollution
with relevant experience, are based in part on the assumption that hearings are not an
important source of information for the agency. This is also implicit in Howland, Principal
Requirements for Northern Pipelines, Proceedings, Canadian Northern Pipeline Research
Conference (February 1972). Dr. Robert Howland was then Chairman of the National
Energy Board.

41. E.g., § 27 of the Canada Water Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 5 (Supp. 1 1970), quote at
note 48, supra, allows the Minister to initiate "public information programs." One of the
stated objectives of the long awaited Environment Canada procedure for environmental
impact assessment is to:
... provide an arms length system for review, advice and expertise, and for (1)
informing the public, and (2) where appropriate, involving the public in
decisionmaking. (Emphasis added).
See Interdepartmental Committee on the Environment, A Procedure for Implementation
of a Federal Environmental Assessment Review and Protection Process (September, 1974).
42. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 16 (Supp. I 1970).
43. See Why Ottawa has Shunned Airport hearing,The Vancouver Sun, Feb. 15, 1973, at
6; Airport answer-men arriving, The Vancouver Sun, Feb. 3, 1973, at 23; Protestorsfailin
attempt to adjourn hearing on Sea Island expropriation, The Vancouver Sun, Jan. 1973, at

15.
44. Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 154.
45. Id.

46. See id. One important consequence is the likelihood that mandatory judicial relief to
compel the agency to provide an opportunity for public participation is unlikely. The
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Control Act empowers the director to "determine in his sole discretion whether the objection shall be the subject of a hearing." 4
Section 27 of the Canada Water Act says:
The Minister may, either directly or in cooperation with any government, institution or person, publish or otherwise distribute or
arrange for the publication or distribution of such information as he
deems necessary to inform the public respecting any aspect of the
conservation, development or utilization of the water resources of
Canada.48
This discretion to permit public participation has not been exercised
liberally. With regard to federal statutes, Franson and Burns conclude
that "although most agencies have the power to hold hearings, few
actually hold them." 4' 9
Third, if authority for public participation is provided, it is usually
in the form of public hearings. Hearings may be appropriate for some
issues, particularly where the decisionmaking agency must carry out
adjudications involving competing proposals or limited numbers of
clearly adverse interests, i.e., where the process is closely analogous
to that of a court. However, lawyers' bias and legislative draftmen's
mechanical reliance on tested provisions have resulted in formal hearings being prescribed when other forms of participation might be
more effective.' 0 An example is a recent hearing held by the Yukon
Territorial Water Board on a proposal by the Northern Canada Power
Commission to build a hydroelectric facility at Aishihik Lake in the
southwestern corner of the Territory. Native people likely to be
affected did participate, but they had little prior information about
relevant remedy, the prerogative writ of mandamus, is often said not to lie to compel the
exercise of a discretionary power in a particular way, but only to compel an exercise of that
power: Henderson v. Hughes, [19631 46 W.W.R. 202 (Man. C.A.); Poizer v. Ward, [19711 4
D.L.R. 316 (Man. C.A.). Matkin's conclusion (supra note 30, at 61) regarding mandamus to
compel rulemaking is equally applicable to mandamus to require public participation in
environmental regulatory proceedings, namely that:
the possibility of prodding administrators into taking action on environmental
issues, like cumulative injuries, through mandamus in the courts seems remote.
47. Pollution Control Act, § 13(4).
48. Can. Rev. Stat. c. 5, § 27 (Supp. 1 1970).
49. Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 154.
There has been little action by governments to implement the August 1973 resolution of
The Canadian Bar Association that:
any individual or group have the status to object to [every project likely to
have a significant environmental impactJ, and that upon such objection, a
mandatory public hearing be held before any government approval or license is
granted.
50. See Ask the People, supra note 36, Appendix A at 2. This problem may underlie
John Graham's outright rejection of an adversarial model for participation. See Graham,
supra note 7, at 20-23.

January 19761

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

the proposed project and appeared intimidated by the very formal
hearing procedure adopted by the Board.' I
The Canada Water Act section quoted above is a rare example of a
provision that recognizes the need for flexibility in choice of technique for public participation. Despite its discretionary form and
possible limitation to public information programs, this section is the
basis for the largely successful public participation program under
the Canada-B.C. Okanagan Basin Study Agreement.5 2
Fourth, while rights to participate may be available to certain
directly affected individuals under the general principles of natural
justice, in practice these are of limited importance. This is because
rights to natural justice safeguards are largely coextensive with locus
standi to initiate judicial review of agency decisions.5 3 This means
that only persons affected significantly in rights or property, and
therefore in at least a different degree than the general public, are
entitled to natural justice safeguards in the agency process. The
doctrine itself thus precludes wide participation by members of the
public.
This should not be surprising, since natural justice principles were
developed by the courts to protect private interests from arbitrary
agency action. They were never intended to provide a vehicle for
public participation, and this is confirmed by their definition
through the case law. For example, they require only that notice and
relevant information be provided to persons likely to be affected
directly, not to the public generally. Such persons must be given an
opportunity to be heard, but this need not necessarily take the form
of an oral hearing, and opportunities to make formal written submissions have sometimes been held to be sufficient.' 4 Perhaps the most
telling feature of the principles of natural justice is that they have
been held to apply only to agency functions that are characterized as
judicial or quasi-judicial.5 I They apply only when the issue involves
51. See Yukon Territorial Water Board, Hearing Transcript (esp. May 26, 1972) at Haines
Junction, Y.T.
52. See Canada-B.C. Okanagan Basin Study, Annual Report (1973).
53. L e., if a court characterizes an agency's function as judicial because of its profound
effects on the applicant's rights and property (see Reid, supra note 30, at 145-45 and cases
cited therein), it may already have determined that the applicant is aggrieved and indeed has
suffered special damage.
54. See R. v. Quebec Labour Relations Board, ex parte Komo Construction Inc., [19691
1. D.L.R. 3d 125 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1967); Quebec Labour Relations Board v. Canadian Ingersoll Rand Co. Ltd. [19691, 1. D.L.R. 3d 417 (Can. Sup. Ct., 1968). It has also been held
that an opportunity to make written representations must be given where a hearing is denied
under a clear statutory discretion to do so. See Western Mines Ltd. v. Greater Campbell
River Water District [19671 58 W.W.R. 705 (B.C. Ct. App.).

55. See Reid, supra note 30, ch. I at 4.
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defined adversary interests in a proceeding that broadly conforms to
the judicial model.
Processes that involve questions of policy not directly in issue
between adversarial parties have often been held to be administrative,5 6 so that natural justice has no application. Yet it is with major
questions of policy that citizens are most interested and concerned,
and it is here that the views of citizen participants can be most
valuable to decisionmakers.
The situation in the United States appears to be somewhat different. The right of members of the public to intervene in administrative proceedings is now widely recognized. Ernest Gellhorn has said:
Most efforts on behalf of public intervention to date have been
focused on establishing a "right" to intervene. This battle has largely
been won, except for the question of how far the "right" extends. 5 7
The reason is that hearing requirements are common in statutes establishing major resource and environmental decision processes. For
example, the Atomic Energy Act requires that a hearing be held on
any construction permit application at the request of any person
whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and that the
person be allowed to participate in the proceeding.5 8 Statutes of this
type are buttressed by Administrative Procedure Act provisions that
allow persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions
within the meaning of the relevant statute to initiate judicial review
proceedings.' 9
Public participation rights at the information collection stage are
fairly extensive in Great Britain. The unitary system of government
in England means that land use planning matters are fully within the
jurisdiction of the national government. Thus urban and regional
planning powers provide the basis for many environmental management decisions. The major vehicle for this control is the Town and
Country Planning Act6 ° administered by the Department of the
Environment.
The Act provides two main opportunities for public participation:
in development by local authorities of "structure plans"-conceptual
statements of policy and priorities to guide basic development
56. See Re Brown and Brock and Rentals Administrator [19451 3 D.L.R. 324 (Ont.
C.A.); Re Ashby (1934), Ont. 421 (Ct. App., 1934).
57., Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 361
(1972).
58. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970).
59. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
60. Town and Country Planning Act 1971, c. 78.
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patterns,6 ' and in formulation of "local plans" that show details of
allocation and implementation. At the latter stage there is an opportunity for citizens to make representations to the local planning
authority. The plan is then submitted to the Minister, who may
authorize a hearing officer to hold a local inquiry at which any
person who objects to the plan will be permitted to speak.6 2
It must be noted, however, that English pollution control statutes
appear to provide even fewer rights or opportunities for participation
than their Canadian counterparts. The main water pollution control
legislation provides no right to object to proposed discharges, even to
riparian owners likely to be directly affected.6 3 J. M. McLoughlin
has said:
A study of English Pollution Control legislation generally shows that
few safeguards for individuals have been incorporated, even where
health and property may be materially affected.... 6 4
C. Deliberation and Decision
Following formal public participation in collecting, clarifying, and
testing information, environmental decisionmakers must render a
decision on the issues before them. At this stage they must weigh and
consider the information presented to them. The process may appear
to be similar to that of a court deliberating on a case following the
close of a hearing.
In fact, however, the analogy is not apt for Canadian and English
environmental agencies. A court must limit its consideration to the
record before it. It must not consider matters outside the record,
either introduced by parties or outsiders or obtained on its own
initiative. 6 5 If it does go outside the record, its decision may be
overturned on review or appeal.
Canadian and English environmental authorities are not subject to
this constraint. They are not limited to the record and, in fact, are
61. See Town and Country Planning Act 1971, c. 78, § § 6-9, as amended by 1972, c.
42, § 3. However, public rights to participate at the structure plan stage have been substantially diluted by 1972 amendments to the Act. The public hearing has been replaced by an
"examination in public" procedure in which a kind of seminar discussion is held by planning
officials with selected experts.
62. Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, c. 78, § § 7-9, as amended by 1972, c. 42,

§ 3.
63. See Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 64, and 1961,
Arrangement of Sections, 9 and 10 Eliz. 2 c. 50; Clean Rivers (Estuaries and Tidal Waters)
Act, 1960, 8 and 9 Eliz. II, c. 54; and Water Act, 1973, c. 37.
64. McLoughlin, Control of the Pollution of Inland Waters, 1973 J. Planning & Environmental L. 355, 360.
65. Subject to the doctrine of judicial notice. See National Law Reform Commission,
Evidence Study Paper No. 6, Judicial Notice (1973).
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often given wide discretion by vague and general guidelines 6 6 or the
entire absence of guidelines. 6 I Some agencies continue to make
decisions on a case-by-case basis without developing specific standards or guidelines. 6 8 Others have established technical standards for
contaminants and exercise discretionary powers of approval by
simply checking off applications against the standards without
further consideration of the consequences of the contaminant-producing action. 6 In either case, decisions may be based wholly or partly
on staff or even consultants' advice obtained outside any formal
hearing or other public participation process. The courts have
generally been reluctant to deprive agencies of informal staff advice
obtained outside the hearing process.7 0
The usual agency procedure is a meeting or series of meetings
between agency members and staff at which issues are clarified and
staff advice tendered. Following agency decisions on basic issues,
staff are directed to prepare draft orders or reasons-for-decision for
the consideration of agency members. 7 In larger agencies, decisionmaking is often decentralized, with approvals issued by regional staff
occasional direction from the agency or superior
with only
7
officials. 2
When hearings are held, formal participation by agency staff is
extremely unusual.7 It is also unusual for staff or members of one
agency or department to make formal submissions in hearings held
by another agency if functions and authority overlap. 7 4 Interagency
consultation normally takes place informally at staff level during all
stages of the decision process, including deliberation.
This is to be contrasted with the situation in the U.S., where
administrative procedure laws require decisions on the record. Staff
66. E.g., National Energy Board Act, Can. Rev. Stat. § 44; B.C. Pollution Control Act,
§ 2; Ontario E.P.A. § 14.

67. E.g., under the Northern Inland Waters Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. 28 (Supp. 1 1970)
and the National Energy Board Act.
68. E.g., The National Energy Board; the Ontario Air Management Branch approvals
section.
69. E.g., The Alberta Department of the Environment under the Clean Air Regulations,
Alta. Reg. 10/73.
70. See, e.g., The Queen v. Board of Broadcast Governors ex parte Swift Current Telecasting Co. Ltd. [19621 33 D.L.R. 2d 449 (Ont. Ct. App.); Johnson and Company
(Builders) Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [ 19471 2 All. E.R. 395 (Ct. App.).
71. This is essentially the procedure followed by the National Energy Board.
72. E.g., The British Columbia Pollution Control Branch and the Ontario Air Management Branch.
73. Staff of the National Energy Board and B.C. Pollution Control Branch do not present
evidence, but act as advisors to agency counsel in hearings.
74. This practice may be increasing however. For example, Environment Canada
presented briefs at both the Aishihik Yukon Territorial Water Board Hearing (supra note 51)
and the Alberta Environment Conservation Authority surface mining hearings in 1972.

January 1976)

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

review of applications takes place prior to hearings, and staff members make formal submissions at hearings. The judicial model is
followed very closely. 7 I
Thus, in Canada the deliberation and decision stage is entirely the
province of the agency, unconstrained by any requirement to make
decisions on the record or by any requirement that public participation be permitted. However, there are several public participation
techniques that are relevant or that can be adapted to this stage.
One is simply to ensure that agency membership represents as
many interests as possible. This has rarely been attempted in Canada.
Appointments are usually by Cabinet Order-In-Council so that even
public service commission criteria need not be followed. 7 6 In practice merit, i.e., experience and technical qualification, has normally
been the main factor. Little attempt is made to ensure that tribunal
members represent a range of interests, disciplines, backgrounds, or
career experiences. 7 7 There are a few notable exceptions, such as
British Columbia's Land Commission 7 8 and Ontario's Niagara
Escarpment Planning and Development Commission. 79 Still, expertise is the dominant factor, and the best training ground is the
regulated industries or activities themselves. Thus it is likely that
only one range of interests will be represented by tribunal members.
It may be important to note that such interest advocacy as does
exist in Canadian agencies probably enjoys freer expression than in
the United States because of the less judicial nature of Canadian
environmental decision processes. There is less pressure to suppress
interest bias in attempts to render impartial judgment on each issue.
Another possible technique is the representative advisory committee. There are a number of Canadian environmental advisory commit75. See Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists Strategy for a "No.
Win"Agency Proceeding, I Ecology L.Q. 495 (1971).
76. See, e.g., Pollution Control Act, § 3; National Energy Board Act, Can. Rev. Stat. § 3

(1970).
77. The Directors of the Ontario Air Management Branch and the British Columbia
Pollution Control Branch are both engineers. So are large percentages of their staffs. Three
members of the National Energy Board are former Board Engineers. Of the eight NEB
members five are engineers and three are economists or specialists in economic policy; all
have previous related government or industry experience.
78. The Commission includes a planner and a noted plant ecologist with conservation
group affiliations. See B.C. Stat. 1973, c. 46.
79. The Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, Ont. Stat. 1973, c. 52,
'established a 17-member regional commission with representatives from a range of interests
to provide advice to the Minister on development of a master plan for the area. Section 5(1)
of the Act specifically provides that nine members of the Commission be appointed as
"representatives of the public at large" and one of the remaining eight be appointed from a
list submitted by the council of each county or region within the Niagara Escarpment
Planning Area.
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tees comprised of representatives of a range of interests. However,
their effectiveness has been limited for several reasons. First,
committees of this type have typically not been given a formal role
in decisionmaking. They are asked for advice by the decisionmaker
whenever he considers it desirable. Ministers' advisory committees
such as those appointed by the Federal and Alberta Ministers of the
Environment are good examples.8 0 Another problem is that
decisionmakers have tended to regard advisory committees as relevant only to policy formulation-in effect, sounding boards for
departmental ideas, usually ideas at very early stages of considera-

tion.8 1

Perhaps the only examples of advisory committees that are closely
involved with either policy or decisionmaking are certain ad hoc
industry-government committees, such as those that have developed
regulations under the Federal Fisheries Act 8 2 and committees concerned with relatively minor and noncontroversial issues, such as
establishment and management of limited area ecological reserves.8 3
When major issues have been referred to representative advisory
committees, the committees' recommendations have often been
ignored. 8 '
Apart from limited success in noncontroversial areas and occasional success in stimulating agency action through criticism and
comment in the media, 8 s the representative advisory committee has
80. See Elder, The Participatory Environment in Alberta, 37 (unpublished report prepared for Canadian Environmental Law Research Foundation 1973); Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, Terms of References (1972). The Federal Environment Minister
also has separate Advisory Councils on Fisheries and Forestry.
81. This has been a complaint voiced by some members of the Canadian Environment
Advisory Council, id.
82. See Morley, supra note 33, at 310.
83. See Franson, Legislation to Establish Ecological Reserves for the Protection of
Natural Areas, supra note 35, at 596-98; Franson, The Ecological Reserves Act of British
Columbia-A Model for Canada, I Nature Canada 29 (1972).
84. See G. Beakhust & P. Usher, Land Regulation in the Canadian North, 20, 28-33
(1973), regarding the "Conservation Group" selected by the Department of Indian and
Northern Affairs to advise on the drafting of the Territorial Land Use Regulations; the
collapse of the Greater Vancouver Regional District "Liveable Region" public participation
program after participants concluded that their policy recommendations were being ignored
by the G.V.R.D. Board. See PlannersShut You Out Because They Fear You, The Vancouver
Sun, Nov. 14, 1974, at 6. See also, Elder, supra note 80, at 37, regarding the ignoring of
citizen advisory committee advice on location of a major dam by the Alberta Environment
Minister. The recommendations on public participation of the Environment Canada
Advisory Council in its report on Environmental Impact Assessment were largely ignored by
the Minister in the establishment of the federal environmental assessment procedure. See
supra note 40.
85. See Elder, supra note 80, at 43, citing criticism by the Alberta Environment Conservation Authority's Public Advisory Committee of environmental implications of the
Syncrude Athabasca Tar Sands Development.
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shown little promise as a technique for achieving effective public
involvement at the deliberation and decision stage of environmental
decisions. In any event, this device should not be regarded as a
substitute for broader public participation at earlier stages. There is
some evidence that it may be used by agencies6 or officials as a kind

of buffer to absorb or defuse public criticism.

D. Implementation and Enforcement
Some agency decisions are self-executing in the sense that no
further action is required by the agency before the authorized activity commences. Often, however, orders are phased; a general authorization is granted, followed by specific final orders after satisfactory
completion of various stages of the authorized activity. 8 7 Orders
may also contain detailed conditions that must be monitored during
8
construction or operation of the approved undertaking or activity. 8
Canadian agencies have, almost without exception, allowed no
public participation following approval-in-principle orders. Final
orders and amending orders are issued routinely, subject only to
required information being furnished and satisfactory staff review. 9
Conditional orders are often monitored by agency staff. However,
under extensive point-by-point control systems, such as the waste
control permit system in British Columbia and the air contaminant
discharge approval system in Ontario, effective monitoring by small
staffs is impossible, and approvals are conditioned so that the permittee must monitor himself, subject to spot checks by the
agency.9 0 There has been little inclination to follow the lead of some
86. See Elder, supra note 80, at 37; Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 200-201,
with reference to advisory committees appointed under the Ontario Provincial Parks Act.
87. For example, the B.C. Pollution Control Branch has issued conditioned provisional
orders initially such as Provisional Permit No. 359-P granted to Utah Construction and
Mining Company, January 20, 1971. See The Utah Controversy, supra note 22, at 64-65.
88. An example is Pollution Control Permit No. P.E.-1240, and Letter of Transmittal
issued to Rayonier Canada Ltd. for its sulphite pulp mill at Port Alice, B.C., March 30,
1973. This permit contained a time limit for completion of authorized works; requirements
for approval of plans and specifications; and detailed standards for suspended solids and
BOD 5 . A second, more stringent set of specific standards for solids, BOD 5 , and toxicity
were required to be reached within a specified time period, Instructions for monitoring and
submission of reports were contained in the letter of transmittal. An appeal against the
terms of the permit taken by the Company under section 12 of the Pollution Control Act
was disallowed by a committee of the British Columbia Cabinet in an order issued January
11, 1973.
89. E.g., National Energy Board routine orders (including crossing orders, leave to open,
etc.) are based entirely on staff recommendations. There is normally no discussion of these
at all at formal Board meetings except to note the numbers of each type.
90. E.g., the Letter of Transmittal with B.C. Pollution Control Permit No. P.E.-1240 (see
supra note 88) required that "The attached monitoring program ... shall be carried out by
the Permittee and results submitted monthly to the Director." In addition, a report containing tabulated data of all sampling and tests carried out by the permittee was to be submitted
yearly.
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U.S. agencies in engaging private consultants to design and administer

implementation and monitoring programs. 9
If the agency declines to enforce statutory prohibitions or conditions in permits, there is little scope for action by members of the
public. Self-monitoring by permit holders makes it difficult in practice for individuals and public interest groups to obtain monitoring
data. If the agency has this information, it may be reluctant to
divulge it to protect its good relations with industry. 9 2 If it does not
have the data, it will not be enthusiastic about getting it for the same
reason and is likely to suggest that citizens contact the industry
9 3 Some agencies simply regard monitoring data as confidendirectly.
94
tial.
Another problem already mentioned is that of discretionary legislation. Canadian courts have been reluctant to grant orders requiring
agency enforcement action in the absence of mandatory statutory
language and clearly established refusal or neglect to act. 9 s Some

statutes contain provisions requiring consent of the Attorney-General
96

to initiate a prosecution, and consent has not been freely given.
Even in the absence of consent requirements, courts have been cool
to prosecutions initiated by private citizens after agency or law
enforcement authorities have refused to prosecute. 9 ' The potential
offered by private prosecutions is discussed below.
91. Such as the contract awarded by the U.S. Department of the Interior to private
consultants to monitor implementation of environmental-social contract stipulations for the
Alaska Oil Pipeline: interview with E. Skinnarland, Terminus Ltd., Aug. 14, 1974.
92. See Morley, supra note 33.
93. In British Columbia it was common practice to refer many requests for information
directly to applicants or permit holders. This was consistent with an information policy that
regarded even the permits themselves as restricted documents. See Lucas, Legal Techniques
for Pollution Control: The Role of the Public, 6 U.B.C. L. Rev. 167, 188 (1971). The
Pollution Control Branch has recently adopted an open file policy. See Franson & Lucas,
Environmental Decision-Making in British Columbia 14, unpublished report prepared for
Canadian Environmental Law Research Foundation (1974). But this may not solve the
problem, where, for example, data reporting by self-monitoring permittees is required (as
under permit P.E.-1240, supra note 88) only on a yearly basis.
94. E.g., The Territorial Water Boards under the Northern Inland Waters Act, Can. Rev.
Stat. c. 28 (Supp. 1, 1971). There is even some question as to whether the water use permits
themselves are regarded as confidential: see letter from W. MacLeod to J. Zaharko, Legal
Services, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Aug. 29, 1974; G. Beakhust & P.
Usher, supra note 84, at 97.
95. See Henderson v. Hughes, [1963] 46 W.W.R. 202 (Man. Ct. App.); Re Copeland and
Anderson, [19721 3 O.R. 248; Matkin, supra note 30, at 56-60; Reid, Administrative Law
and Practice 386-88 (1971).
96. See Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 155, citing Pits and Quarries Control
Act, Ont. Stat. 1971, c. 96, § 18(2). Consent to prosecute is also required under the Alberta
Clean Water Act, Alta. Stat. 1971, c. 17, § 9.1.
97. See R. v. Walske Ready-Mix Concrete Ltd., unreported, heard Feb. 3 and April 22, at
Haney, B.C. (Nicholson, Prov. J.); R. ex. rel. McCarthy v. Adventure Charcoal Enterprises
Ltd., 1 Can. Environmental L. News 1 (1972) (Ont. Prov. Ct.). In the latter case costs were
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Complaints can, of course, be made to the agency. But Canadian
and English statutes rarely contain formal complaint procedures, so
that consideration of complaints is entirely a matter of grace. There
are no provisions such as that in the U.S. Administrative Procedure
Act, 9 8 under which persons or groups may petition an agency and
attempt to establish the necessity for a hearing.
LEGAL ACTIONS AS VEHICLES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Objectives of Environmental Litigation
The basic purpose of private civil actions and judicial review
actions is to vindicate private property rights that are infringed or
threatened by some other person, corporation, or public authority.
The object of criminal or quasi-criminal prosecutions is to punish
unlawful activity and establish a deterrent through penal or
monetary sanctions.
Environmental issues have been raised in both civil and criminal
proceedings. However, the objectives of the initiators of many of
these environmental actions have not been conventional. Their
primary concerns have not been protection of private economic
interests or imposition of sanctions. Rather, the actions have been
viewed as a means of generating political pressure for changes that
may remedy basic environmental problems. 9 9 Success by citizens
and interest groups in legal actions of this type has provided leverage
to force administrators and politicans to make legislative or policy
changes on matters affecting the quality of the natural and human
environments.' o o In the case of well-publicized and ably-conducted
actions, even losses have resulted in effective pressure on the responsible elected or appointed officials.' 0 1 It is the process that is imactually awarded against the private prosecutor following a successful prosecution under the

Ontario E.P.A.
98. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970).

99. See Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 156, 169; Environment on Trial, supra note
27, at 266-67.
100. See The Utah Controversy, supra note 22, at 54-55, 74.
101. Perhaps the best example is the James Bay hydroelectric development litigation. An
injunction action was brought by affected Indians and other inhabitants of the region
against the Quebec Crown Corporation, the developer. Following a lengthy trial, at which
extensive evidence was introduced as to historical and present native land use and occupancy, an interim injunction was granted. See Le Chef Max Gros Louis v. La Societe De
Development De La Bale James, [19741 R.P. 28 (C.S.). The injunction was subsequently
suspended by the Court of Appeal (Nov. 22, 1974, No. 09-000890-72; Tremblay, Turgeon
and Casey J.J.A.), and this was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada: Kanatewat v.
James Bay Dev. Corp., [19741 1 N.R. 557; 41 D.L.R. 3d 1 (S.C.C.). However, notwithstanding this reversal, the litigation prqvided significant leverage for the native groups in
compensation and land claims negotiations that followed.
Another example of effective use of the judicial forum for representations on an issue of
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portant, not the result. The courtroom becomes a forum in which
members of the public can raise substantive issues through direct
evidence, cross-examination and argument, even though such opportunity may have been denied by the agency during its decision
process.
The impact of well-publicized legal proceedings, win or lose, on
agency and politicians can be considerable in Canada, as well as in
England and the United States." 02 The question is, to what extent is
this forum available to public interest litigants and how effective is
the opportunity for public participation thus provided?
Effectiveness of Courtroom Participation
In Canada the answer appears to be that the courts normally
cannot be expected to provide an adequate forum for public participation. There are a number of basic problems.
A. Standing for Judicial Review
The principles upon which litigants are accorded locus standi in
Canadian courts are narrow and technical. To get into court the
plaintiff must establish that he is a person aggrieved in the sense that
he has suffered special or peculiar damage beyond that suffered in
common with the rest of the public.1 3 Until recently, apart from
wide public importance is Re Paulette's Application to file a Caveat, [19731 6 W.W.R. 97
(N.W.T.S.C.). The case involved a reference to the court by the Territorial Registrar of Titles
after 16 chiefs representing Indian Bands in the Territories sought to file a caveat under the
Land Titles Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. L4, § 154(!)(b) (1970), claiming an interest in some
400,000 square miles of land based on aboriginal title. Morrow, J., heard evidence as to
historical use and occupancy and native understanding of the effect of treaties dating from
the early part of the century. His Lordship held court in native communities in the area of
the claim, often sitting outdoors, and sometimes attending at the homes of old people to
take evidence. (See 119 et seq.). It was held that there was sufficient basis upon which to
file a caveat. A prohibition application by the Crown challenging Morrow, J.'s jurisdiction to
hear this evidence was dismissed by the Federal Court: Atty. Gen'l. of Canada v. Morrow, J.,
[19731 6 W.W.R. 150 (F.C.T.D.).
102. This idea appears to underlie much of Professor Sax's writing. See, e.g., J. Sax,
Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action, foreword (1971). For a similar
view of participation in agency proceedings see Like, supra note 76. In Franson & Lucas,
supra note 93, at 15-20, it is suggested that there is evidence that the appeal procedure
under the British Columbia Pollution Control Act is being used as a vehicle for public
participation.
103. See R. v. Vancouver Zoning Board of Appeal; ex parte N.W. Point Grey Homeowners' Association, [19661 60 D.L.R. 2d 331 (B.C.A.A.); Cowan v. C.B.C., [1966] 56
D.L.R. 2d 515 (Ont. Ct. App.) Smith v. Atty. Gen'l. of Ontario, [1924] S.C.R., 331; Green
v. The Queen, [1973] 2 O.R. 396; [19731 2 Can. Environmental L. News I (Ont. H.C.). It
should be noted that in most prerogative writ applications (there is some question about
mandamus), the court has a discretion to allow standing. See R. v. Vancouver Zoning Board
of Appeal; ex parte N.W. Point Grey Homeowners Association, supra at 33943; and Re
Surrey By-law 1954 No. 1291, [1957] 6 D.L.R. 2d 768, 769 (B.C. Sup. Ct.). Unfortunately

January 19761

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

several cases which establish taxpayer standing to challenge the
constitutionality of certain statutes,' 04 the old locus standi principles developed in the context of public nuisance actions appeared
to be the law.' 0 s
The recent decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Stein v.
The City of Winnipeg" 06 may have changed the situation considerably. Stein brought an action to restrain the city from proceeding
with a program of spraying trees and shrubs on city property with
the insecticide methoxychlor. The Chambers Judge denied the
plaintiff's application for an interim injunction, even though it was

clear that the city had failed to comply with Section 653(1) of the
City of Winnipeg Act. 0 7 This section requires the executive policy
committee of the council to conduct an environmental impact review
of "every proposal for the undertaking by the City of a public work
this discretion is seldom exercised. In two recent federal court prerogative writ cases involvig the National Energy Board, the court assumed that any party granted standing by the
Board under a discretionary power had standing before the court. See Atty. Gen'l. of
Manitoba v. National Energy Board and Dow Chemical Ltd., No. T-2669-74 (F.C.T.D. Aug.
9, 1974), Cattenach, J.; and Union Gas Ltd. v. National Energy Board, No. T-2983-74
(F.C.T.D. Aug. 21,1974), Mahoney, J. However, Cattenach, J.,did assume that a party must
have an interest beyond that of the public generally. In a preliminary order his Lordship
denied standing to the president of a small independent oil company appearing in person
because he had not participated in the N.E.D. hearing and because it was difficult for the
court to see what he could add to submissions of counsel for the other parties (July 18,
1974). However, at the same hearing standing was granted to the Attorney General of
British Columbia, who had not been represented at the N.E.B. hearing. See also Estey,
PublicNuisance and Standing to Sue, 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 569 (1972); Franson & Burns,
supra note 10, at 154. Another potential basis for participation by citizens or public interest
groups is intervention in ongoing actions that raise issues of general public concern. An
example is the recent intervention by several civil liberties and women's groups in the
Supreme Court of Canada appeal of R. v.Morgantaler, an abortion prosecution. See "Civil
Liberties, Women's Groups Will Fight Abortion Conviction," The Toronto Globe and Mail,
Sept. 4, 1974, at 2. It should be noted that such interventions are by leave of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine. See Rules of the Supreme
Court of Canada, 1945, R. 60, as amended (effective July 2, 1970). For intervention by an
environmentalist of a planning appeal under a broadly similar power in a provincial statute,
see Re Cleveland Holdings Ltd., 3 Can. Environmental L. News (1974). Apart from statute,
intervention as amicus curiae is solely in the discretion of the court. See Clelland v. Godon
and Conway, [19621 38 W.W.R. 372 (Man. Q.B.).
104. See Thorson v. Atty. Gen'l of Canada, [1974] 1 N.R. 225; MacNeil v. Atty. Gen'l.
of Nova Scotia, No. 03925 (N.S. Sup. Ct. Apr. 30, 1974), Hart, J.:Aff'd. S.H. No. 03925
(N.S. Ct. App. July 19, 1974), MacKeegan, C.J.N.S., and Coffin and Macdonald, J.J.A..
105. Despite some evidence of discontent in the profession, part of the Canadian Bar
Association's 1973 Resolution on Public Participation in Environmental Decisions, see
supra note 48, stated that:
any individual or group on its own behalf or in behalf of the public have the
status before all courts or administrative tribunals to review [projects] or
enforce any government regulations without demonstrating a special interest
or damage.
106. Unreported, Manitoba Court of Appeal (June 10, 1974), Freedman, C.J.M.; Monnin
and Matas, J.A.A.
107. Man. Stat. 1971, c. 105.
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which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment."
On appeal, the issue of locus standi arose, and the court held that
Stein had standing, notwithstanding that there was no evidence of
"special and peculiar" damage. There was no constitutional challenge, but Matas, J. A., held that by analogy to the Thorson case, 0 8
it must be possible for a citizen to enforce the statutory requirement
in Section 653(1). He referred to other sections of the City of Winnipeg Act that demonstrated an "express intention to involve citizen
participation in municipal government" and concluded that:
Section 653 has created an obligation to review the environmental
impact of any proposal for a public work which may significantly
affect the quality of human environment. If that section is not to be
considered as a mere pious declaration there must be inferred a
correlative right, on the part of the resident, in a proper case, to have
a question arising out of the sections adjudicated by the court., 09
Stein offers promise for removal of the standing barrier that has
confronted most environmental litigants. Several aspects of the case
may, however, limit its impact. The statute contained an environmental impact assessment requirement stated in mandatory terms.
Like most municipal acts, it also included other provisions for wellestablished forms of public participation, such as community
advisory committees and zoning hearings. In addition, the provision
was unusual, in that it was clearly patterned after Section 102(1)(c)
of the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act,' 1 0 which owes its
effectiveness largely to citizen enforcement through legal actions.
The court was thus able to quote a number of the leading NEPA
authorities with approval.
It may also be significant that Stein was a property owner, and it
was admitted that spray applied to the city's boulevard trees would
inevitably drift into nearby private property. It was also established
that the insecticide to be used was potentially toxic to susceptible
humans, including the plaintiff. Thus, it might have been possible for
Stein to establish a likelihood of actual damage, sufficient to satisfy
even traditional locus standi requirements.
Finally, it is significant that after granting Stein standing the
majority of the court denied the interlocutory injunction because he
failed to carry the burden of proof under balance of convenience
test.
108. Thorson v. Atty. Gen'l. of Canada [19741 1 N.R. 225.
109. Unreported, Manitoba Court of Appeals (June 10, 1974).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
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B. Scope of Review
Another basic problem of the judicial forum is illustrated by the
case of Green v. The Queen.' '' Under well-established principles of
judicial review, courts confine review of decisions by environmental
agencies to essentially procedural and jurisdictional issues. To enter
the merits would be to usurp the function of the agency, especially
where the agency is given discretionary power by statute.
In Green the plaintiff, who owned no land in the area, sought an
injunction to prevent sand removal outside a provincial park which
threatened the recreational value of the park. The court was primarily concerned with whether there had been compliance with the
provisions of the Ontario Provincial Parks Act. Lerner, J. rejected the
possibility of a public trust, based upon the declaration in the Act
that "all Provincial Parks are dedicated to the people of the Province
of Ontario and others who may use them for their healthful enjoyment and education, and the Provincial Parks shall be maintained for
the benefit of future generations in accordance with this Act and the
regulations. 1 12 If he had found such a trust, he could have considered whether sand removal violated the trust.' ' 3
There is no Canadian equivalent to recent United States legislation
that permits actions by any person to enjoin damage to public resources.' '4 Nor have there been promising developments or revivals
of appropriate common law doctrines such as the public trust, as has
occurred in the United States.' ' I Finally, there are no general
statutory requirements to assess the environmental impact of proposed actions that could provide a basis for judicial review, as the
NEPA impact statement requirements have in the U.S.1 1 6
C. Access to Information
Another problem is access to agency information by litigants.
Often factual information necessary to assess the viability of legal
111. [19731 2 O.R. 396; [19731 2 Can. Environmental L. News 1 (Ont. H.C.).
112. Provincial Parks Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. 1970, c. 371, § 2.
113. Green v. The Queen, [1973] 2 0.R. 396; [19731 2 Can. Environmental L News 1
(Ont. H.C.).
114. The pioneering statute of this type is the Michigan Environmental Protection Act,
1970, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § § 691.1201-691.1207 (Supp. 1972). For a report on
effectiveness see Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A

ProgressReport, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1003 (1972).
115. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
116. See J. Macdonald & J.Conway, Environmental Litigation 160-74 (1972); F. Anderson, N.E.P.A. in the Courts (1973). Section 653 of The City of Winnepeg Act which was
the basis of the action in the Stein case, supra text accompanying notes 106-110, has

apparently been repealed upon the recommendation of the Greater Winnipeg Council. See
Note, 3 Can. Environmental L. News 134 (1974).
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action or properly to frame the action is withheld by agencies as
confidential. The Vancouver Airport expropriation hearings, referred
to above, provide a good example.' 1 7 The technical reports necessary for the Sea Island residents fully to understand the impacts of
the proposed airport expansion were disclosed by the Ministry of
Transport only after the citizens pressed hard in the hearings and the
media took up the cry. It is perhaps ironic that the legal relief
ultimately sought was time to review and digest the quantities of
technical material that were eventually disclosed.' ' s An even more
graphic example is the refusal by the Department of Indian and
Northern Affairs, administrators of the territorial land use regulations, to disclose the terms of land use permits so that affected native
people could assess whether Arctic petroleum operators were in
breach of the permit terms.' 19
Confidentiality has a proper role in the parliamentary process.' 2 0
Indeed, confidentiality undoubtedly has a role in maintenance of
efficient administrative processes. However, it is difficult to justify
failure by environmental agencies and departments to disclose such
documents as factual staff and consultants' reports and permits or
approvals containing detailed conditions under which regulated
industries must operate.
Franson and Burns conclude that there is too much secrecy in
Canadian government, with the result that:
countless factual documents are languishing in public offices because
public servants have no authority to release them and fear that if they
do, their careers will be harmed; and two, that this secrecy frustrates
and angers the very public servants caught in its trap, impairing their
usefulness to all of us.' 21
They recommend that legislation be enacted to establish the right of
Canadian citizens to obtain information from agency or departmental files. At present there is no Canadian legislation of this type,
not even of the presumption of openness variety, similar to the U.S.
Freedom of Information Act.' 22 In fact, public service oaths of
office clearly make the basic presumption in Canada one of nondisclosure. However, Franson and Burns also warn that care should be
taken in drafting such legislation to avoid including exempt classes
117.
118.
119.
120.

Supra note 43.
See Grauer v. The Queen and Isador Wolfe [19731 F.C. 355 (T.D.).
See G. Beakhust & P. Usher, supra note 84, at 97.
Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 163.

121. Id. at 164 and materials cited at n. 48. See also Franson, Government Secrecy in
Canada, 2 Nature Canada 31 (No. 2, 1973).
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
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that may lead to abuses
such as those that have been documented in
States. 1 2 3

the United

D. Tort Actions
Tort actions directly against resource users offer the apparent
advantage of easier access to substantive issues. Courts are not
obliged to limit themselves to a procedural review of agency decisions. 1 24 The nature of the action requires that the defendants'
resource use and the alleged damage to the plaintiff or his property
be fully considered. However, such actions have proven largely
ineffectual, 1 2 1 mainly because of the public nuisance doctrine and
its "special or peculiar damage" requirement for locus standi.
Another constraint on tort actions has been cost. Legal fees and
major disbursements, such as transcript costs, may be substantial. In
addition, full discovery procedures and lengthy trials require the
attendance of large numbers of expensive scientific experts for long
periods of time.' 21
E. Cost
The cost constraint is important in all types of legal actions.
Judicial review proceedings tend to be less expensive than tort
actions, since the former are based mainly on affidavit evidence, and
there is usually no pretrial discovery. However, even judicial review
costs can be an unmanageable burden for public interest groups or
individuals. It must be remembered that in Canada and England,
unlike the United States, costs of the action, based on a scheduled
tariff, are usually awarded against the unsuccessful party. Thus, in a
losing action a public interest group can expect to bear not only its
own legal costs, but the taxed costs of the other parties as well.' 27
In addition, Canadian environmental groups are small and very
poorly funded by comparison with United States groups such as the
Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. Public interest law firms are
practically nonexistent. The only major legal group in the environmental field is the Canadian Environmental Law Association
(CELA). This group has brought some important actions, but chronic
123. See Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 164 and literature cited at n. 48.
124. Though agency approvals may permit defendants to raise a defense of statutory
authority, Canadian courts have tended to restrict the scope of this defense. See McLaren,
The Common Nuisance Actions and the Environmental Battle- Well.Tempered Swords or
Broken Reeds? 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 505, 545-46 (1972).
125. See Franson & Burns, supra note 10, at 155.
126. See Fraser & Anthony, Litigating Environmental Issues in Ask the People, supra
note 37, at 98.
127. See Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 256-57.
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shortage of funds has forced careful selection of issues with a view to
cost and has precluded public interest actions on the scale of those
brought in the United States by organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund. Only recently have efforts to obtain legal aid
for environmental litigants met with some success. 2 8
F. Procedure
Further constraints include procedural restrictions, such as the
rigidly structured format for presentation of evidence and the legal
rules of evidence. To the extent that the latter establish rather
narrow criteria for relevance, severely restrict opinion evidence' 2 9
and purport to exclude heresay altogether, citizens are likely to find
the proceedings confusing and intimidating. Full consideration of
environmental issues is also hindered by the tendency of Canadian
courts to limit the admission of background social, economic, and
technical data and to restrict policy arguments based on such
material.' 30 The value of the proceeding as a forum for public participation is diminished accordingly.
G. Private Prosecutions
In only one area does Canadian law appear to offer a potentially
useful technique for public participation through the judicial process
that is generally unavailable to citizens in the United States' 3 1 and
England.' 32 This is the private prosecution.
Prosecutions for summary conviction offenses, which include all
important offenses under provincial and federal environmental
statutes, may be initiated by private citizens.' 33 This can be done
128. See id. at 262-66; and report of successful legal aid application by a Toronto
ratepayers group opposing a rezoning application in 2 Can. Environmental L. News 169-70

(1973).
129. In a recent pollution prosecution, R. v. Cherokee Disposals and Construction Ltd.,
[19731 3 0.R. 599 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), the court showed great flexibility in accepting opinion
evidence of non-expert witnesses as to condition of water. See Note, 2 Can. Environmental
L. News 160 (1973); and R. v. Sheridan, [1973] 2 O.R. 192 (Ont. D.C.).
130. For example, in Re Piatocka and Utah Construction Mining Co., [ 19711 21 D.L.R.
3d 87 (B.C. Sup. Ct.), the plaintiff was not permitted to introduce evidence as to site
expenditures made by Utah Construction and Mining Company prior to application for the
pollution control permit.
131. In the United States, the private prosecutor has no role at all. See Burns, Private
Prosecutions in Canada: The Law and a Proposalfor Change, 21 McGill L.J. 30 (1975); B.
Grossman, The Prosecutor 13-14 (1969).
132. The rights of private prosecutors in England appear to be limited by a greater range
of statutory consent requirements than exist in Canada. See Burns, supra note 131, at
271-73; J. McLoughlin, supra note 64, at 361.
133. See Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 121, 327-338; Burns, supra note 131,

at 287-93; S. Berner, in Private Prosecutions and Environmental Control Legislation: a
Study (1972), concluded that private citizens have extensive rights to initiate private prosecutions under federal environmental statutes.
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even though the agency or law enforcement officers decline to
proceed. Once the information is laid and the process issued, the
citizen-informant may prosecute the matter himself unless it is taken
over by a Crown prosecutor.1 34 These rights have been confirmed in
a number of cases, many of which have been prosecuted by the
Canadian Environmental Law Association.' 31
Potential constraints on this type of proceeding include the possibility of a consent requirement in the statute, which is rare,' 36 the
somewhat theoretical discretion of a Justice of the Peace to refuse to
issue a summons; 1 3 7 and the possibility that the Attorney General
will exercise his right to enter a stay of proceedings and shoulder the
political consequences of such action.' 31
Media impact can be very effective in private prosecutions because
of the criminal nature of the proceeding. Another important advantage is that costs are minimized, especially if the services of public
interest lawyers are obtained. In the event of a dismissal, there is no
obligation to pay the defendant's costs.' 39 Perhaps the only major
problem is one already discussed-access to monitoring data necessary to lay the charge that may be in the possession of the agency or
the industry.' 4
H. Judges
Finally, there is a fundamental problem faced by Canadian and
English environmental litigants that may never be fully remedied.
Judges tend to be conservative. There is little of the U.S. tradition of
judicial legislation, little sense of a dynamic policy role for the
courts.' "' Canadian and English judges tend, partly as a result of
134. Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 333.
135. E.g., R. ex. rel. McCarthy v. Advanture Charcoal Enterprises Ltd., 1 Can. Environmental L. News I (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1972); R. v. Cherokee Disposals and Construction Ltd.,

119731 3 O.R. 599 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); R. ex rel. Rayner v. Lake Ontario Cement Ltd., 2 Can.
Environmental L. News 8 (1973).
136. It is apparently less rare in England. See McLoughlin, Control of the Pollution of
Inland Waters, supra note 64, at 357.
137. See Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 330 for tactics including tips on
"shopping" for cooperative J.P.'s.

138. See Burns, supra note 131, at 283-85.
139. See Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 257.
140. See text accompanying notes 101-102.
141. See Thompson, The Last Bottle of Chianti and a Soft Boiled Egg, Proceedings of
Canadian Law and the Environment Workshop No. 1, Oct. 7 and 8, 1971. There are
numerous case examples in the environmental field. In a British Columbia private prosecution, R. v. Walske Ready-Mix Concrete, unreported, heard Feb. 3 and Apr. 22, at Haney,
B.C., counsel for the informant simply could not convince the court that the consent of the
Director of Pollution Control is clearly not necessary to initiate a prosecution under the
Pollution Control Act. The charge was dismissed from the bench on the ground that the
private prosecutor lacked "standing." In R. ex rel. McCarthy v. Advanture Charcoal
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their education and experience and partly as a result of deep-rooted
judicial tradition, to formulate issues in conceptual legal terms. They
are often not unmindful of the policy considerations involved in any
issue but continue to protest that they must never be seen to legislate. Thus, while courts do in fact make policy, they do not do it
overtly, and little discussion of the underlying issues is permitted in
the course of proceedings or is expressed in judgments.
CONCLUSION
A selective review of Canadian federal and provincial environmental legislation and a full review of case law suggests that citizens'
rights to participate in decisions by resource and environmentalmanagement agencies are not extensive. There is also evidence that
agencies with discretion to permit opportunities for public participation are generally either not doing so effectively or not doing so at
all. In particular, participation has been extremely limited at the
important issue formulation stage of agency decision processes.
There are also few rights or opportunities to participate in implementation and enforcement of agency decisions.
A number of constraints, including lack of access to information,
restrictive formal procedures, narrow scope of review and substantial
cost, limit the effectiveness of public participation through legal
actions. However, private prosecutions appear to offer potential for
citizen participation in enforcement through the courts. There is also
a substantial basis in the Stein case for breaking down the locus
standi rule that has proven a major obstacle to use of legal actions in
the courts as vehicles for public participation.

Enterprises Ltd., I Can. Environmental L. News 1 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1972) Judge A. A.
McLean convicted the charcoal plant, imposed a $500 fine, and assessed costs against the
private prosecutor remarking that the prosecution was "irresponsible and frivolous."
Fortunately, the Ontario Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the cost award: 1 Can.
Environmental L. News 5 (1972). See also Environment on Trial, supra note 27, at 27-28.
For a more optimistic view of American judicial disposition, see J. Sax, Defending the

Environment 149-53 (1971).

